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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY

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22 October 1965

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India-Pakistan: The UN is taking a new approach toward securing the withdrawal of Indian and Pakistani troops from territory occupied during the recent hostilities.

Secretary General Thant has decided against sending the withdrawal problem to the Security Council at this time. He had contemplated this step following India's rejection of his proposal for a meeting at UN headquarters between Prime Minister Shastri and President Ayub. U Thant now reportedly plans to send messages to Shastri and Ayub proposing to appoint Brazilian Major General Sarmiento, currently on the staff of the UN Emergency Force in Palestine, to start work on a withdrawal plan. Thant will request New Delhi and Karachi to send representatives to begin discussions with Sarmiento.

Ambassador Goldberg, in conversations with Indian Foreign Minister Singh and Pakistani Foreign Minister Bhutto, has found general agreement on the need to move forward on a withdrawal plan. Singh emphasized the necessity for agreement on disengagement between troop commanders at the local level, but thinks that such agreements might be worked out simultaneously with negotiations for an over-all withdrawal plan. Bhutto expressed skepticism over Indian willingness to discuss a political settlement for Kashmir following troop withdrawal, as called for in the UN cease-fire resolution. However, he also indicated his government's willingness to negotiate a withdrawal agreement now.

Both Singh and Bhutto expressed opposition to holding another meeting of the Security Council on the Indo-Pakistan situation at this time. However, the Pakistanis presumably will follow through with previously announced plans to take the issue to the General Assembly in the absence of further progress toward a political settlement.

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The military front between Pakistan and India remains generally quiet, although Indian leaders continue to warn that the cease-fire will end if Pakistan carries out purported plans to send additional armed infiltrators into Kashmir.

In Kashmir, the Indians have arrested 26 more members of the self-determination movement following demonstrations on 20 October in Srinagar. Included in the latest group detained for "antinational activities" were two moderate leaders who had not been arrested on 9 October when five other more radical spokesmen were taken into custody. These moderates, followers of Kashmir's popular hero Sheikh Abdullah, have been instrumental in the past in steering Kashmiri unrest into nonviolent channels. Their prolonged imprisonment could further aggravate the restiveness in Srinagar.


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Indonesia: The basic contest between Sukarno and the army continues, and other Indonesian elements are being drawn in.

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on 21 October Sukarno ordered that destructive activities be stopped, that no demonstrations be held without prior permission, and that people "refrain from slander based on vengeance." The order, carried on Djakarta Radio, was said to have been issued "to surmount the consequences of the 30 September incident."

Sukarno has also ordered Brigadier General Sukendro to leave the country on a three-month trip to see how other nations "stand on their own feet." Sukendro is close to General Nasution and, since early October, has been outspokenly anti-Communist. Sukendro's "exile" may be Sukarno's counter to army pressure for the dismissal of Air Force Commander Marshal Dani, who has also been sent abroad.

Third Deputy Prime Minister Chaerul Saleh on 20 October publicly identified himself with Sukarno. He called on the people to let Sukarno find a political settlement for the 30 September movement and warned against betrayal of the "great leader." He said he trusted Sukarno to punish the "guilty ones" but emphasized that the success of the revolution is even more important than punishing those involved in the plot.

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\*Dominican Republic: (Information as of 4:30 AM EDT)

President Garcia Godoy's hesitation to begin the arms collection operation in the face of attempts by Bosch and rebels to impose new conditions is endangering the president's retention of authority.

The arms collection operation, postponed again yesterday, is now scheduled to begin today. The decision to delay, as reported by a US military attaché, may have been caused by a rebel demand that the four government tanks, which entered the Ozama fortress in the former rebel zone at the beginning of this week's disturbances, be withdrawn. Ambassador Bennett reported late yesterday afternoon that a compromise had been reached and two of the tanks would be withdrawn. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Bosch and former "Constitutionalist" president Caamano are insisting that Garcia Godoy remove Armed Forces Secretary Rivera Caminero and the three service chiefs before the arms collection begins. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Garcia Godoy's cabinet is also pressuring the president for the military leaders' removal. This move is apparently led by Freddy Prestol Castillo--the leftwing advisor to the president--and leftist Attorney General Ramon Morel Cerda.]

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[Military leaders are aware of the move to force their ouster and are attempting to gain support from moderate political leaders in a possible showdown with the president should he accede to rebel demands.]

[Joaquin Balaguer, who withdrew his support from the provisional government following the murder of a rightwing politician on 16 October, has publicly declared his support for the arms collection plan. Former president Balaguer agreed to Garcia Godoy's request for support on the condition that the service chiefs not be dismissed. He has sent representatives to Rivera Caminero urging him not to give in on the issue of arms collection.]

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[Fear of military "reprisals" reportedly is causing some panic in the former rebel zone. Leftist groups are whipping up this emotion, hoping to force Garcia Godoy to postpone indefinitely the arms collection and to remove the military chiefs. Many in the zone may use the delay to hide their weapons.]

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Greece: [The US Embassy in Athens warns that Greece is still facing "imminent and heavy pressures on the stability and progress achieved in the past dozen years."]

[The embassy points out that the formation of a government without former prime minister Papandreou has split the Greek political center and encouraged both the right and the left to become more active. Papandreou's opponents say that the effectiveness of this political center could be destroyed for "years to come" if elections--which he is urging--are held in the present tense atmosphere. They assert that the result would be a left-right dichotomy, which has proved calamitous for Greece in the past.]

[The weak government of Prime Minister Stephanopoulos is unlikely to garner enough support to deal effectively with Greece's problems, including its sagging economy. Stephanopoulos has been unable to add to his 152 to 148 majority in Parliament and has threatened to resign unless it improves. His resignation would rekindle the political crisis, and public demands for elections would mount.]

[The fiscal policies of the Papandreou government and the two months of political turmoil have weakened the economy, already threatened by a decline in foreign exchange reserves. The government has undertaken steps to stabilize the immediate situation which, Talbot remarks, may require external assistance if they are to be effective. However, the prospects for a rapid strengthening of the economy are limited.]

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NOTES

Rhodesia: [Prime Minister Smith will meet with UK Prime Minister Wilson in Salisbury early next week for urgent discussions on Rhodesia's impending declaration of independence. Wilson may still hope to obtain some last-ditch formula acceptable to the white Rhodesian minority which would ensure progress toward African majority rule. Failing this, he may attempt to impress the white Rhodesian community with the seriousness of the consequences of a unilateral declaration of independence. Smith, who is under strong domestic pressure to stand firm, is unlikely to make substantial concessions.]

[REDACTED]

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Sudan: Increased friction within the Umma and National Union Party (NUP) coalition in Khartoum is again threatening to break up the relatively moderate four-month old government. NUP president Ismail al-Azhari, who serves as president of the Sudan's Supreme Sovereignty Council, a group functioning as collective chief of state, is attempting to establish that he outranks the Umma's Prime Minister Mahjoub. The issue arose again over the question of which leader would head the Sudan's delegation to the OAU conference in Accra. The coalition has survived similar conflicts, but radical elements in the NUP who resent the domination of the larger and generally conservative Umma will continue to press for an early break. Several NUP cabinet members are already said to have resigned.

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## NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

The United States Intelligence Board on 21 October 1965 approved the following national intelligence estimates:

SNIE 31-1-65: "India's Nuclear Weapons Policy"

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NIE 11-14-65: "Capabilities of Soviet General Purpose Forces"

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The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

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U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

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The Administrator

The Atomic Energy Commission

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The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

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